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INTRODUCTION 
Expressed sequence tags (ESTs) are short DNA sequences 
containing the information to code usually a portion of a protein, and 
many debate whether they should be patented.1 In In re Fisher,2 the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit3 found that, despite having 
several potential uses as research tools, ESTs lacked utility, which is 
required for patentability.4 The court’s analysis of utility was flawed, 
however, because it did not apply the traditional evidentiary 
standard, misapplied its own evidentiary standard, failed to recognize 
there was sufficient substantial utility as a research tool under 
Brenner v. Manson,5 and altered the specific utility requirement in 
detrimental ways without distinguishing or reconciling prior 
precedent. 
The Federal Circuit not only misconstrued the case, but its 
failure to adequately address the policy implications of the decision 
reveals general problems with the treatment of policy considerations 
in the patent system. First, as Professor Arti K. Rai articulates, the 
Federal Circuit appears unwilling to address policy concerns at all,6 
 
Copyright © 2006 by Samantha A. Jameson. 
 1. Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in Genes and 
Gene Fragments: A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85 IOWA L. REV. 735, 
738–39 (2000). 
 2. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 3. The Federal Circuit hears all appeals in patent cases. Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and 
Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1037 
(2003). 
 4. Id. at 1368, 1379. 
 5. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966). 
 6. See id. at 1123 (“[T]he Federal Circuit appears to be quite resistant to economic policy 
analysis.”). 
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which supports the argument that there is no institution in the current 
patent system both willing and able to address policy.7 Second, the 
distinction the Federal Circuit draws between ESTs of genes with 
known and unknown functions is not meaningful, and illustrates that 
utility makes a poor doctrinal mechanism with which to draw the 
distinctions the court may be interested in, such as preventing an 
anticommons.8 Third, Fisher illustrates the recurring problem of using 
technology-specific rules when the court either does not understand 
the science or is making unreviewable policy determinations.9 Fisher 
falls at the center of many pressing policy considerations, and 
provides a useful lens to analyze and support prior theories about the 
consideration of policy and technology specific rules. 
This Note begins in Part I by providing the necessary general 
background on the utility requirement, ESTs, and DNA patents. Part 
II then provides a summary of the Fisher court’s analysis of the utility 
of the ESTs. The evidentiary, substantial utility, and specific utility 
problems with the analysis are laid out in Part III. Finally, Part IV 
analyzes the policy problems and theoretical implications of the 
decision. 
I.  THE BACKGROUND: UTILITY AND EST HISTORY 
A. The Utility Requirement Generally 
Of the requirements for a patent,10 utility is the most important in 
Fisher.11 Utility generally requires that the invention be “useful.”12 
 
 7. See id. at 1040–41 (“[N]o institution has taken responsibility for elaborating patent law 
in the fact-specific, policy-oriented manner that the language of the statute encourages.”). 
 8. The anticommons concept was first articulated in Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 
698, 698 (1998). Matthew D. Satchwell, Note, The Tao of Open Source: Minimum Action for 
Maximum Gain, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1757, 1763–64 (2005). 
 9. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1157 (2002).  
 10. Patentability has five major requirements: the invention must be within a patentable 
category, have utility, be nonobvious to a practitioner in the field, be novel, and be adequately 
disclosed. Byron V. Olsen, The Biotechnology Balancing Act: Patents for Gene Fragments, and 
Licensing the “Useful Arts,” 7 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 295, 312–13 (1997). 
 11. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (affirming the rejection of the 
claims based on lack of utility). 
 12. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
may obtain a patent therefor . . . .” (emphasis added)). Utility is also a constitutional 
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The threshold for utility is typically quite low.13 An inventor must 
proffer at least one reasonable use for the invention, and, so long as 
the invention can perform the function asserted for it, even if it does 
so poorly, it may be patentable.14 Only those inventions “totally 
incapable of achieving a useful result” or those that are inoperable 
are barred from patentability by the utility standard.15 
In Brenner, however, the Supreme Court articulated an elevated 
utility standard for research intermediates. In that case, a chemical 
process produced a product whose only known utility was as an object 
of scientific inquiry.16 The Court found that a “use” as an “object of 
scientific research” (an “object of use-testing”) was insufficient to 
meet the utility requirement, whether the claims were to the product 
or to the processes that produced it.17 A patent is not intended to be a 
“hunting license”; it must relate to “commerce” rather than 
“philosophy.”18 A plausible reading of Brenner characterizes this 
distinction as one between basic research that must be left in the 
public domain and patentable applied technology with tangible 
benefits.19 In re Joly20 clarified that the utility of an intermediate could 
 
requirement based on the mandate to promote the “useful arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 
(emphasis added); U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2107.01 (8th ed., 2d rev. 2004) [hereinafter 
MPEP]. 
 13. Holman & Munzer, supra note 1, at 757. For example, one court said, “The threshold 
of utility is not high: An invention is ‘useful’ under section 101 if it is capable of providing some 
identifiable benefit.” Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 14. Holman & Munzer, supra note 1, at 757. 
 15. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 16. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 529 (1966). 
 17. See id. at 535 (“We find absolutely no warrant for the proposition that although 
Congress intended that no patent be granted on a chemical compound whose sole ‘utility’ 
consists of its potential role as an object of use-testing, a different set of rules was meant to 
apply to the process which yielded the unpatentable product.”). 
 18. Id. at 536 (quoting In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 970 (C.C.P.A. 1968)). 
 19. See Andrew T. Kight, Note, Pregnant with Ambiguity: Credibility and the PTO Utility 
Guidelines in Light of Brenner, 73 IND. L.J. 997, 1012 (1998) (“[T]he utility requirement 
operates to distinguish between basic research and applied technology. In this sense, it serves a 
timing function, ‘leaving basic research discoveries in the public domain until they have yielded 
tangible benefits and have thereby left “the realm of philosophy” and entered “the world of 
commerce.”’” (quoting Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the 
Patentability of Certain Inventions Associated with the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences, 
23 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 6 (1995) (quoting Ruschig, 343 F.2d at 970)). A full analysis of the Brenner 
decision is beyond the scope of this piece. 
 20. In re Joly, 376 F.2d 906 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
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be shown through the utility of the final product, but simple use as an 
intermediate was not sufficient to show utility.21 
Thus, the Supreme Court in Brenner rejected a “de minimis” 
view of utility,22 and instead offered a new test requiring both specific 
and substantial utility:23 
The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the 
Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by 
the public from an invention with substantial utility. Unless and until 
a process is refined and developed to this point—where specific 
benefit exists in currently available form—there is insufficient 
justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove 
to be a broad field.24 
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically defined “specific” 
and “substantial,” the Federal Circuit and its predecessor court have 
developed definitions.25 Substantial utility, synonymous with 
“practical utility,” is “a shorthand way of attributing ‘real-world’ 
value to claimed subject matter.”26 It requires that an invention, in its 
current form, can be used in “a manner which provides some 
immediate benefit to the public.”27 A “real world” use will not exist if 
there must be further research to identify or confirm the use.28 
In order to possess specific utility, “an application must disclose a 
use which is not so vague as to be meaningless.”29 There must be a 
“well-defined and particular benefit to the public.”30 Examples of 
asserted utilities that fail on the specific utility requirement include 
 
 21. Id. at 908; Timothy A. Worrall, The 2001 PTO Utility Examination Guidelines and 
DNA Patents, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 123, 130 (2001). 
 22. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Fisher court’s summary of the 
utility requirement is a generally good overview of the law. Justice Story’s “de minimis” view of 
a “‘useful’ invention is one ‘which may be applied to a beneficial use in society, in 
contradistinction to an invention injurious to the morals, health, or good order of society, or 
frivolous and insignificant.’” Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532–33 (1966) (quoting Note on 
the Patent Laws, 3 Wheat. App. 13, 24 (1818)).  
 23. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371. 
 24. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534–35. 
 25. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371. 
 26. Id. (quoting Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 27. Id. (quoting Nelson, 626 F.2d at 856). Utility does not require that the product or 
process be superior to existing products or processes. Olsen, supra note 10, at 314. 
 28. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1372; MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I). 
 29. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371. 
 30. Id. 
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“biological activity,” “biological properties,” and “technical and 
pharmaceutical purposes.”31 These are so “nebulous” that they fail to 
communicate an explicit indication of use for the compounds in the 
application.32 The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), meanwhile, 
takes the view that specific utility must be “specific to the subject 
matter claimed,” as opposed to the “general utility . . . applicable to 
the broad class of the invention.”33 This diverges, however, from court 
precedent and is less preferable than the approach taken by previous 
courts.34 
Although an invention must have specific utility and substantial 
utility that does not require further research to confirm, it is 
irrelevant to determining specific and substantial utility that an 
invention is used as a research tool.35 As with any other invention, the 
critical question under Brenner for research tools is whether they are 
unpatentable objects of use-testing or patentable items in the “world 
of commerce.”36 Despite controversy surrounding the patentability of 
research tools under Brenner,37 many research tools have implicitly 
been recognized to fall into the latter category because they were 
found to be patentable.38 That research tools meet the Brenner 
 
 31. Id. (quoting In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 941 (C.C.P.A. 1967)). 
 32. Id. (quoting Kirk, 376 F.2d at 941). 
 33. MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I). The Fisher court says this is consistent with its 
interpretation of utility. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1372. 
 34. Generally, the application of this standard to other technologies would be problematic 
because patents on distinct but related products with similar uses would be excluded from 
patentability. See infra Part III.C.  
 35. See MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I) (“Office personnel must distinguish between 
inventions that have a specifically identified substantial utility and inventions whose asserted 
utility requires further research to identify or reasonably confirm.”). The Fisher court favorably 
cited and accepted this analysis. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1372. A determination that an invention is a 
research tool does not help determine whether the invention meets these utility standards. See 
id. (“An assessment that focuses on whether an invention is useful only in a research setting 
thus does not address whether the invention is in fact ‘useful’ in a patent sense.”). 
 36. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535–36 (1966) (quoting In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 
970 (C.C.P.A. 1968)). 
 37. Compare Justine Pila, Bound Futures: Patent Law and Modern Biotechnology, 9 B.U. J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 326, 354 n.79 (2003) (expressing the view that the PTO guidelines were contrary 
to Brenner in making a designation as a research tool irrelevant), with Natasha N. Aljalian, The 
Role of Patent Scope in Biopharmaceutical Patents, 11 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 58 n.220 (2005) 
(expressing the view that a particular invention’s use as a research tool should meet the Brenner 
utility requirements). 
 38. For example, the PTO has recognized chromatographs, screening assays, and 
nucleotide sequencers are all patentable despite being research tools because they have clear, 
specific, and unquestionable utilities. MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I).  
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standard is evidenced by the increase in patents covering research 
tools.39 
To reject an application based on lack of utility, the patent 
examiner must make a prima facie showing that it is more likely than 
not that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would not consider that 
any utility asserted by the applicant would be specific and 
substantial.”40 An applicant’s assertion of utility creates a 
presumption that the utility is sufficient to meet the utility 
requirement.41 Only if a prima facie case is made does the applicant 
have the burden to provide rebuttal evidence to convince one skilled 
in the art of the invention’s utility.42 
B. The Molecular Biology of ESTs 
The patent in In re Fisher involved expressed sequence tags 
(ESTs).43 Organisms have their genetic information, or “genome,” 
stored in DNA.44 The information from the DNA is copied into 
mRNA, and then from mRNA into proteins, which do most of the 
work in the cell.45 RNA is chemically distinct from DNA,46 and the 
mRNA sequence differs from that of the original DNA because non-
coding sequences in the middle of the gene’s DNA sequence are 
removed.47 Researchers may then copy the mRNA sequence into 
cDNA, which contains the same chemical components as DNA, but 
has the same sequence as the mRNA.48 Because different cells will 
 
 39. See David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent Policy, 20 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 985, 997 (2005) (noting the number of patents on biotechnology research 
tools has increased substantially). 
 40. MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.02(IV).  
 41. Id. § 2107.02(III). 
 42. See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (1995) (“Only after the PTO provides evidence 
showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt the asserted utility does the 
burden shift to the applicant to provide rebuttal evidence to convince such a person of the 
invention’s asserted utility.”); MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.02(VI) (“If a rejection [is] properly 
imposed, . . . the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut the prima facie showing.”). 
 43. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 44. BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL, at G:15 (4th ed. 2002).  
 45. Id. at 302, 335–36. 
 46. Id. at 302. 
 47. Id. at 317–18. 
 48. See id. at 503–04 (describing cDNA production to make a “library” of sequences). 
cDNA is made because it is more stable and more manipulable by scientists. See Margaret 
Sampson, Comment, The Evolution of the Enablement and Written Description Requirements 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in the Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1237 (2000) 
(“Scientists can generate stable copies of mRNA using the original DNA nucleotides (A, G, C, 
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express different proteins at different times, the collection of cDNAs 
from those cells will differ.49  
ESTs are lengths of cDNA that typically do not contain the 
entire gene sequence.50 Among other uses,51 the ESTs can help isolate 
the full gene sequence and can identify where the gene is expressed.52 
These uses are based on an important property of ESTs, and all DNA 
sequences, in binding and recognizing complementary sequences.53  
C. DNA Patents Prior to Fisher 
Because DNA has “specific chemical structures that impart 
specific properties,”54 courts treat it as a chemical for the purposes of 
patentability,55 despite problems associated with the treatment of 
DNA only as a chemical.56 Historically, the PTO granted patents on 
 
and T). These condensed copies of genes, called complementary DNA (‘cDNA’), have been 
crucial in the development of recombinant DNA technology.”). 
 49. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 44, at 503 (“Because the cells of different tissues 
produce distinct sets of mRNA molecules, a distinct cDNA library is obtained for each type of 
cell used to prepare the library.”). 
 50. Holman & Munzer, supra note 1, at 748. The length of the EST is limited by the length 
of DNA that can be sequenced at any one time, which is shorter than the length of the full gene. 
Id. at 749. It is possible a short gene could be encoded by an EST, but that situation is likely to 
be rare. Id. 
51. See infra Part III.A. 
52. Holman & Munzer, supra note 1, at 749. 
 53. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 44, at G:9 (“Two nucleic acid sequences are said to be 
complementary if they can form a perfect base-paired double helix with each other.”); id. at 534 
(describing a microarray that can be used to detect the presence sequences based on their ability 
to bind their complementary sequences). In the DNA code, each base pairs with one other base: 
A with T and C with G. Id. at 194. The complementary sequence has the paired base for the one 
in the sequence of interest, and is in the opposite orientation. See id. at 195 (“[M]embers of each 
base pair can fit together within the double helix only if . . . the polarity of one strand is oriented 
opposite to that of the other strand . . . . [E]ach strand of a DNA molecule contains a sequence 
of nucleotides that is exactly complementary to the nucleodite sequence of its partner strand.”). 
For example, the sequence “ACTGGA” would have the complement “TCCAGT.” 
 54. Worrall, supra note 21, at 136. 
 55. See In re Wallach, 378 F.3d 1330, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (treating a gene as a chemical 
compound for the purposes of the written description requirement); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai 
Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding that “[a] gene is a chemical compound, 
albeit a complex one,” and treating the gene as a chemical compound for purposes of 
conception). 
 56. Courts have been slow to recognize the “informational link” between DNA and 
protein. See Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New 
Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 836 (1999) (“[The Federal Circuit failed] to 
recognize DNA-based technologies as involving information first and foremost . . . . [T]o the 
extent that it has acknowledged this link, the CAFC appears to be well behind the technology.”) 
This is particularly clear in the nonobviousness standard, where knowing a method of 
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ESTs. For example, a patent issued on ESTs from genes coding 
members of a protein family with a generally known function.57 The 
functions of the specific genes associated with the ESTs, however, 
were not always precisely known. For example, the PTO granted a 
patent for proteins secreted from cells, even though it was not known 
what specifically the proteins did.58 Many EST applications were 
notable because of their broad claims to an EST, the full associated 
gene, and its future uses.59 
In response to pressure from the scientific research community,60 
the PTO revised its utility examination guidelines61 in 200162 to require 
further characterization of the cDNAs, including ESTs.63 Under the 
PTO’s new standards, an identification of a gene and a function are 
sufficient to show utility.64 However, uses such as mapping genes, 
probing for genes, and identifying chromosomes do not meet the 
specific utility test, unless the associated sequence correlates with a 
disease.65 Because the PTO lacks rulemaking authority, courts do not 
 
identifying a gene and a partial protein sequence does not make the DNA sequence obvious for 
purposes of patentability because the court focuses on DNA as a chemical. Id. at 833–34 
(describing In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). This is problematic because a DNA 
sequence may be deemed nonobvious merely because no structurally similar chemical exists, 
even if the sequence was “easy or routine” to isolate based on a technical use of the 
informational connection. Id. at 833–36. 
 57. See Human Kinase Homologs, U.S. Patent No. 5,817,479 (filed Aug. 7, 1996) (issued 
Oct. 6, 1998) (patenting ESTs of genes encoding protein kinases); Holman & Munzer, supra 
note 1, at 771 (noting proteins in the kinase family were known to be involved in signaling). 
 58. See Secreted Proteins and Polynucleotides Encoding Them, U.S. Patent No. 5,654,173 
(filed Aug. 23, 1996) (issued Aug. 5, 1997) (patenting sequences from genes that produce 
secreted proteins); Holman & Munzer, supra note 1, at 773 (“[W]hen the patent application was 
filed, Genetics Institute apparently did not know what the secreted proteins might be.”). 
 59. Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the 
Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 104 (1999). 
 60. Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The 
Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 840 n.111 (2001). The research 
community “continues to resist broad patenting of the most upstream research.” Id. 
 61. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
 62. The interim guidelines were issued in 1999, and the final guidelines issued in 2001. Rai, 
supra note 60, at 840. 
 63. See Holman & Munzer, supra note 1, at 759 (describing a prominent PTO official’s 
belief that the revision of the utility guidelines was intended to heighten the utility requirement 
by requiring a characterization of the cDNA).  
 64. See Holman & Munzer, supra note 1, at 759 (“For example, the PTO will apparently 
consider the identification of the open reading frame of a nucleic acid sequence to be sufficient, 
at least in combination with the identification of a functional domain.”). 
 65. Id. at 760; MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I). See infra Part III (discussing why this 
standard is inappropriate). 
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defer to these guidelines.66 They are nevertheless significant because 
they establish the posture of cases that come to the courts.67 Also, the 
Federal Circuit in Fisher demonstrated great willingness to accept 
these particular guidelines.68 
II.  THE FISHER COURT’S ANALYSIS OF UTILITY 
The patent application in Fisher was for five ESTs generated 
from corn leaf tissue at a particular period in development.69 The 
structure and function of the underlying genes and proteins were not 
known,70 but the proposed utilities of the ESTs included: 
(1) serving as a molecular marker for mapping the entire maize 
genome, which consists of ten chromosomes that collectively 
encompass roughly 50,000 genes; (2) measuring the level of mRNA 
in a tissue sample via microarray technology to provide information 
about gene expression; (3) providing a source for primers for use in 
the polymerase chain reaction (“PCR”) process to enable rapid and 
inexpensive duplication of specific genes; (4) identifying the 
presence or absence of a polymorphism; (5) isolating promoters via 
chromosome walking; (6) controlling protein expression; and (7) 
locating genetic molecules of other plants and organisms.71 
The patent applicants also suggested the ESTs could be used to 
screen for, identify, and characterize the underlying genes.72 
 
 66. Rai, supra note 3, at 1132. 
 67. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 250 (3d ed. 2002) (“To the extent that the 2001 Guidelines 
indicate a tightening of agency policy, the PTO will be denying more applications than it 
previously would have and, as those disappointed applicants appeal to the Federal Circuit, the 
agency will find itself defending its new approach in court.”). 
 68. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The PTO’s standards for 
assessing whether a claimed invention has a specific and substantial utility comport with this 
court’s interpretation of the utility requirement of § 101.”). 
 69. Id. at 1367–68. 
 70. Id. at 1368, 1373. 
 71. Id. at 1368. 
 72. See Corrected Brief for Appellants at 13, In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(No. 04-1465), available at Posting of Dennis Crouch to Patently-O blog, http://patentlaw. 
typepad.com/patent/2005/03/monsanto_asks_t.html (Mar. 23, 2005) (“[T]he claimed ESTs could 
be used as research probes to screen a cDNA library for the specific gene sequence to which the 
EST uniquely corresponds. The successful hybridization . . . [to the] corresponding gene 
sequence would confirm that the gene was being expressed in certain tissues, at certain times, by 
certain organisms.” (citation omitted)). 
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Despite these assertions, the court rejected the patent, finding 
that the ESTs lacked utility.73 The court wanted a showing by the 
applicant that the ESTs were actually or could be used in the asserted 
ways.74 The court found the application fell short under this 
evidentiary standard because the asserted uses were merely 
“hypothetical possibilities” any EST could achieve, but which the 
particular ESTs in the application had not achieved.75 
Turning to substantial utility, the Federal Circuit analogized the 
case to Brenner, in which the applicant was not allowed to claim a 
process for preparing compounds of unknown use.76 The court viewed 
the ESTs as only being useful as research intermediates to identify, 
isolate, and experiment on the underlying genes of unknown 
functions.77 Because the ESTs were employed to search for a use of 
the underlying gene, there was no “immediate, well-defined, real 
world benefit to the public.”78 Thus, the ESTs were seen as 
unpatentable “mere ‘objects of use-testing,’” which the court defined 
as an “object[] upon which scientific research could be performed 
with no assurance that anything useful will be discovered in the 
end.”79 
The court rejected the analogy between the ESTs and the 
microscope, a quintessentially patentable research tool.80 The analogy 
was based on the fact that both the microscope and the ESTs can 
generate data about a sample with unknown properties.81 The court, 
however, found it significant that the microscope immediately reveals 
the structure of a sample through magnification, while the ESTs can 
only detect the presence of the genetic material with the same 
 
 73. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1379. 
 74. See id. at 1373–74 (“Fisher has not presented any evidence . . . showing that the claimed 
ESTs have been used in either way. . . . There also is no disclosure establishing that any of the 
claimed ESTs were used or, for that matter, could be used to control or provide information 
about gene expression.”). 
 75. Id. at 1373. For example, while ESTs could be used to identify promoters, the applicant 
did not provide any evidence the ESTs actually identified a promoter. Id. 
 76. See id. at 1374 (“We agree . . . that the facts here are similar to those in Brenner . . . . 
The Brenner court held that the claimed process lacked a utility because it could be used only to 
produce a compound of unknown use.”). 
 77. Id. at 1373–74. 
 78. Id. at 1376. 
 79. Id. at 1373. It should be noted that the “assurance” of a useful discovery appears to be 
an addition to the Brenner standard described in Part III.B. 
 80. Id. at 1373. 
 81. Id. 
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structure, and provide no information on the structure or function of 
the underlying gene.82 
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit emphasized that the use of an 
EST as an intermediate is not sufficient for utility.83 The court also 
suggested that a similarity to other ESTs was insufficient to 
demonstrate utility.84 Although this appears consistent with Brenner, 
which held that an applicant could not show the utility of a steroid by 
relying on the uses of structurally similar steroids, Brenner rested on 
the recognized unpredictability of steroid compounds, a property not 
inherent in ESTs.85 
Next considering specific utility, the court held that the uses were 
not specific because any EST from any gene has the potential to 
perform any of the proposed uses.86 Under the traditional view of 
specific utility, the court analogized the uses to the “nebulous” and 
nonspecific assertion of “biological activity” as a use.87 The court also 
accepted the PTO’s alternative formulation that required the use be 
specific to the claimed invention,88 and found the ESTs did not meet 
that standard since any EST would have the same uses.89 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1375. 
 84. First, the court noted that the steroids in Joly did not have utility even though they 
were structurally similar to steroids known to be useful. Id. at 1375. Second, the court rejected 
the applicants’ reliance on In re Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322, 1327–28 (C.C.P.A. 1980), in which the 
court found untested compounds had utility based on their structural similarity to tested 
compounds that were also claimed. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1376. The ability to rely on other ESTs to 
show utility appeared to be limited to cases were the EST relied on was also claimed in the 
patent, analogous to the Jolles situation as described by the Fisher court. See id. at 1377 (“Fisher 
did not show that even one of the claimed ESTs had been tested and successfully aided in 
identifying a polymorphism in the maize genome or in isolating a single promoter that could 
give clues about protein expression.”). 
 85. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532 (1966) (“[D]espite the reference to the 
adjacent homologue, respondent’s papers did not disclose a sufficient likelihood that the 
steroid . . . would have similar tumor-inhibiting characteristics. . . . [T]he presumption that 
adjacent homologues have the same utility has been challenged in the steroid field because of ‘a 
greater known unpredictability of compounds . . . .’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 86. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1374. 
 87. Id. at 1374–75. 
 88. Id. at 1372. The court thought the PTO’s standard was consistent with the previous 
standard. See id. (“The PTO’s standards for assessing whether a claimed invention has a specific 
and substantial utility comport with this court’s interpretation of the utility requirement . . . .”). 
 89. Id. at 1374. 
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Lastly, while the court was generally uninterested in policy,90 it 
did consider policy issues specifically mentioned in Brenner.91 Brenner 
discouraged granting monopolies without utility.92 Such monopolies 
had boundaries that could not be precisely delineated, and thus the 
monopoly would block areas of scientific development without 
benefiting the public.93 The Fisher court viewed granting a patent on 
ESTs as giving an impermissible “hunting license” because the only 
use would be to gain more information about the underlying genes.94 
III.  WHY THE FISHER COURT’S ANALYSIS OF UTILITY  
WAS INCORRECT 
A. The Proposed Uses Are Sufficient Under the Traditional 
Evidentiary Standard for Utility  
The Fisher court did not apply the traditional evidentiary 
standard and failed to scientifically analyze the asserted utilities.95 A 
technical evaluation of the asserted utilities shows the assertions were 
sufficient under both a traditional and an elevated evidentiary 
 
 90. See id. at 1378 (“Congress did not intend for these practical implications to affect the 
determination of whether an invention satisfies the [patentability] requirements . . . . [P]ublic 
policy considerations . . . are more appropriately directed to Congress as the legislative 
branch . . . rather than this court as a judicial body responsible simply for interpreting and 
applying statutory law.”). The court decided the utility issue without considering the policy 
concerns. See id. (“Policy reasons aside, because we conclude that the utility requirement of § 
101 is not met, we hold that Fisher is not entitled to a patent for the five claimed ESTs.”). 
 91. See id. at 1375–76 (quoting Brenner and describing the Supreme Court’s concern with 
“creating an unwarranted monopoly to the detriment of the public”). Although the Brenner 
considerations appear to be policy issues, the court never described them as such. 
 92. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“[A] process patent in the chemical 
field, which has not been developed and pointed to the degree of specific utility, creates a 
monopoly of knowledge which should be granted only if clearly commanded by the statute.”). 
This portion of Brenner was quoted in Fisher. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1375–76. 
 93. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534. 
 94. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1376. While the court quoted the language on the relationship to 
“commerce” and “philosophy” from Brenner, 383 U.S. at 536, the court failed to apply this 
language specifically to the EST situation. One possible application would be that the ESTs 
were not the ends of research related to commerce, but were tools to be used in searching for 
practical utility in “the realm of philosophy.” Id. 
 95. See Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1380 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“[T]his court . . . discounts these 
ESTs because it concludes (without scientific evidence) that they do not supply enough 
information.”). A technical analysis appears to be necessary to accurately determine if the uses 
asserted are substantial and specific. This Part provides the technical analysis of the uses, and 
Parts III.B and III.C address whether these uses are substantial and specific as technically 
described. 
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standard for utility, contrary to the assertion that the uses were only 
“hypothetical.”96 
Traditionally, the initial burden is on the PTO to establish a 
prima facie case that it is more likely than not that a person of 
ordinary skill in the art would not consider the utility specific and 
substantial.97 There is no requirement the applicant prove the utility 
with statistical certainty.98  
The Fisher court, however, did not follow this standard. Rather 
than find that the PTO failed to established a prima facie case 
because there was no showing that the ESTs were incapable of 
performing the asserted functions,99 the Fisher court shifted the 
burden to the patent applicant to prove the uses100 and show they 
were actual, not “hypothetical.”101 The court could not require that 
every invention actually be used prior to patenting and maintain 
consistency with other patent law principles.102 Thus, under the new 
standard the Federal Circuit adopts here, there should be a similar 
exception to that found in the “on sale” doctrine for “devices [that] 
are so simple and their purpose and efficacy so obvious that their 
 
 96. Id. at 1373 (majority opinion). 
 97. MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107(II). 
 98. MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.02(VII). 
 99. See Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1381 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Board did not reject Fisher’s 
utilities on the basis that the ESTs were unable to perform the purported utilities. Thus, the 
Board did not establish a prima facie challenge to the ESTs’ ability to perform these two 
utilities.”). 
 100. See id. at 1374 (majority opinion) (“Fisher failed to prove that its claimed ESTs can be 
successfully used in the seven ways disclosed.”). 
 101. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. This standard is different even from In re 
Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967), that found “conjectural” uses were not sufficient for utility 
because the examples of “conjectural” uses primarily included cases where there was no known 
use. See id. at 945 (“[I]f a process for producing a product of only conjectural use is not itself 
‘useful’ . . . the starting materials . . . are [not] ‘useful.’ It is not enough that the specification 
disclose that the intermediate exists and . . . can be used to produce some intended product of 
no known use.”). 
 102. For example, this would bar patents on impractical, but operable inventions, such as 
producing water and oxygen from moon rocks, which traditionally have been considered 
patentable. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 67, at 216 (describing Ex parte McKay, 200 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 324 (P.T.O. Bd. App. 1975)) (describing that even though making water and 
oxygen from moon rock is not practical on earth, utility is not typically measured by what is 
practical). It could be problematic for the PTO to bar inventions that are prohibitively 
expensive to practice at the time of invention, rather than letting the market determine what is 
practical, because the market may be a better judge of feasibility. See id. (“[T]he claimed 
inventions might have been prohibitively expensive to implement, but no one expressed doubt 
as to whether the claimed methods would work . . . . [T]he PTO issues the patent and lets the 
market decide the practicality of the inventions.”). 
08__JAMESON.DOC 11/14/2006  8:42 AM 
324 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:311 
complete construction is sufficient to demonstrate their 
workability.”103 This is supported by language in Fisher suggesting that 
a use one of ordinary skill would consider certain could meet the 
elevated evidentiary standard.104  
Regardless of the standard adopted, at least some uses of the 
ESTs should meet the evidentiary standard. Under the traditional 
standard of convincing a person of ordinary skill in the art, one skilled 
in the art would be convinced the ESTs could be used in the asserted 
ways because “many in the research community” view ESTs as useful 
research tools.105 Even if a higher standard requiring certainty is used, 
at least some of the uses would not be considered hypothetical by one 
skilled in the art.106 To illustrate this, it is necessary to scientifically 
analyze what researchers in the field view as the uses of ESTs.107 
Uses based on known complement binding properties of ESTs108 
would be recognized as certain uses. Such uses would include 
 
 103. E. Rotorcraft Corp. v. United States, 384 F.2d 429, 431 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
 104. First, the court lists whether the ESTs “could be used to control or provide information 
about gene expression” as an alternative to whether they were actually used. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 
1374. Second, the court found there was no proof that the ESTs “can be successfully used in the 
seven ways disclosed,” id. at 1374 (emphasis added), rather than continuing to insist on the 
absence of actual use. Third, the court required more than “merely hypothetical possibilities,” 
which would be met either by a certain ability to use the invention or an actual use. See id. at 
1373 (“[A]ll of Fisher’s asserted uses represent merely hypothetical possibilities, objectives 
which the claimed ESTs, or any EST for that matter, could possibly achieve, but none for which 
they have been used in the real world.”). There is, however, a great deal of language 
emphasizing actual uses are necessary. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
Nevertheless, the combination of the actual use and potential to use language suggests that a 
certain ability to use an invention could be sufficient to show utility.  
 105. Stacy Lawrence, US Court Case to Define EST Patentability, 23 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 513, 513 (2005). Many researchers, however, believe that because ESTs are 
research tools, they should be left in the public domain unless they are related to a specific 
process. Id. Even amici in Fisher opposed to patentability recognized the asserted uses were 
nothing other “than already well-known potential uses.” Brief of Genetech, Inc. as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Affirmance and Supporting the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office at 13, In 
re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1465), available at Posting of Dennis Crouch to 
Patently-O blog, http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/files/genentech_amicus_brief_for_in_re_ 
fisher.pdf (Mar. 23, 2005). 
 106. On the other hand, if actual use without any exceptions for certain ability to use were 
required, despite the language in Fisher and inconsistency with other patent law principles and 
precedent, the ESTs would likely fail on that standard if they were not actually used. See supra 
notes 97–98, 102, 104 and accompanying text. 
 107. Although the following discussion is aimed at examining the uses under the elevated 
standard, any use accepted under the elevated standard would also be accepted under the lower 
traditional standard. Thus, acceptance of particular uses as research tools is not discussed under 
the traditional standard unless the analysis diverges from that of the elevated standard. 
 108. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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“measuring the level of mRNA in a tissue sample via microarray 
technology to provide information about gene expression,” 
“providing a source for primers for use in the polymerase chain 
reaction (‘“PCR’”) process to enable rapid and inexpensive 
duplication of specific genes,”109 and screening for or identifying the 
underlying genes.110 A microarray consists of several known cDNAs 
that can bind cDNA made from a sample to determine which genes 
are expressed.111 Because ESTs can bind their matching 
complementary sequence, one skilled in the art would know with 
certainty they can be used in a microarray based on this property 
alone. The ability of the EST to bind its complement also makes its 
ability to identify the underlying gene or create PCR primers that 
bind and allow amplification of the target sequence certain.112 
Similarly, the mapping uses of “isolating promoters via chromosome 
walking” and “serving as a molecular marker for mapping the entire 
maize genome”113 are certain based on the same complement 
sequence binding properties because ESTs are in fact used in 
mapping.114 
Despite these uses, not all uses in “controlling protein 
expression”115 are certain. Decreasing protein expression is a more 
certain use similar to designing PCR primers because complementary 
sequences can be used to prevent the conversion of mRNA 
 
 109. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1368. 
 110. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 111. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 44, at 534. 
 112. PCR generates many copies of a genetic sequence in a short time by heating the sample 
to separate DNA strands, hybridizing primers that are sequence specific, synthesizing a 
complementary strand, and repeating this process. Id. at 508–09. The primers are short DNA 
sequences complementary to the ends of the sequence of which amplification is desired (the 
target sequence). Id. Identification or characterization of the underlying gene could involve 
PCR or microarray techniques. 
 113. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1368. 
 114. See, e.g., H.-M. Ma et al., An EST Survey of the Sugarcane Transcriptome, 108 
THEORETICAL & APPLIED GENETICS 851, 851 (2004) (sequencing ESTs to better understand 
the sugarcane genome); Jianzhong Wu et al., A Comprehensive Rice Transcript Map Containing 
6591 Expressed Sequence Tag Sites, 14 PLANT CELL 525, 525 (2002) (describing an EST map, 
which can be used for further mapping efforts, of the rice genome by creating ESTs, designing 
primers to the ESTs, and locating the sequences in a library). Chromosome walking uses the 
complementary binding properties to determine the next portion of the genomic sequence 
beyond what is known. ANTHONY J.F. GRIFFITHS ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO GENETIC 
ANALYSIS 810 (7th ed. 2000) (“[Chromosome walking is] [a] method for the dissection of large 
segments of DNA, in which a cloned segment of DNA . . . is used to screen recombinant DNA 
clones from the same genome bank for other clones containing neighboring sequences.”). 
 115. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1368. 
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information into protein.116 On the other hand, increasing protein 
expression would likely require adding back the complete protein 
sequence, which is not a certain use if the EST does not contain the 
complete sequence.117  
It is almost certain that ESTs can be used in “locating genetic 
molecules of other plants and organisms” or “identifying the presence 
or absence of a polymorphism.”118 While it is extremely likely there 
are similar genes in other organisms and polymorphisms, it is also 
possible there are not.119 Thus, if the standard were that one of 
ordinary skill must think the use likely, these uses would suffice. If the 
standard required absolute certainty, these would fail.  
The Brenner prohibition on analogies to similar chemicals to 
show utility120 should not bar the considerations of the general 
properties of ESTs to show the utility of the particular ESTs. In 
Brenner, analogies were prohibited for steroids, in which minor 
variations could result in large changes in function.121 The Court in 
Brenner acknowledged that this rule might be limited to certain 
technologies.122 Although the effect of a change on a steroid may be 
unknown, the effect of a change in EST sequence alters only the 
 
 116. Small double-stranded RNAs can be used to prevent the production of the associated 
proteins based on its ability to bind the mRNA. Craig C. Mello & Darryl Conte, Jr., Revealing 
the World of RNA Interference, 431 NATURE 338, 339–40 (2004). 
 117. A gene can “be rather easily integrated into random positions of many animal 
genomes,” including an egg cell to produce an animal carrying the gene. ALBERTS ET AL., supra 
note 44, at 540–41. 
 118. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1368. 
 119. Typically, genes in diverse organisms will be similar. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 
44, at 453 (“[G]enes with similar functions can be found in a diverse range of living things. . . . 
[T]he actual nucleotide sequences of many genes are sufficiently well conserved that 
homologous genes . . . can often be recognized across vast phylogenetic distances.”). A 
polymorphism is a difference between copies of a gene in different individuals, which may or 
may not be present. See id. at G:28 (“Polymorphic: Describes a gene with many different 
alleles.”). If there are no polymorphisms, there could be no use of them by plant breeders to 
determine heritage, which was another asserted use. Corrected Brief for Appellants, supra note 
72, at 18. Similarly, whether the ESTs could be used to determine the source of a tissue or 
provide an understanding of the response of a tissue to various treatments, Corrected Brief for 
Appellants, supra note 72, at 15, would depend on whether there are differences in expression 
between tissues or treatments. 
 120. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 121. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532 (1966). 
 122. Id. (“In these circumstances and in this technical area, we would not overturn the 
finding of the Primary Examiner, affirmed by the Board of Appeals and not challenged by the 
CCPA.”). 
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sequence to which it will bind, a predictable change.123 Thus, there 
should be no prohibition against relying on what is known about 
general EST properties. 
Because some of these uses are certain to be recognized by those 
skilled in the art merely based on the properties of the “constructed” 
EST, they should not be considered hypothetical. 
B. The Proposed Uses Do Meet the Substantial Utility Standard 
The Fisher court claimed, based on Joly and Brenner, the ESTs 
lacked utility because they were mere objects of use-testing and were 
just intermediates that produced a product with no known use 
because the underlying genes had no known function.124 The court 
failed to recognize, however, that the ESTs had uses sufficient for 
substantial utility, and that their status as research tools or 
intermediates should not bar their patentability. 
Brenner held that a use as an “object of use-testing” was not 
sufficient to show utility.125 An “object of use-testing” appears to be 
an “object of scientific research,” as was the case in Brenner because 
the steroid had no known use and was merely the object of “scientific 
inquiry.”126 The Joly court indicated that a function as an intermediate 
was similarly insufficient to show utility.127 Rather than suggesting that 
intermediates were unpatentable, however, the Joly court allowed the 
utility of an intermediate to be shown by its product.128 
The ESTs do not fail under Brenner and Joly for two reasons. 
First, the ESTs are not objects of use-testing lacking substantial utility 
because the EST itself is not an object of use-testing. Rather, the 
object of study is the underlying gene or the genome. ESTs are 
chemically and legally distinct from the mRNA and genomic DNA 
 
 123. The Federal Circuit held in regards to the description requirement that a protein 
sequence would put one of ordinary skill in the art in possession of the entire genus of DNA 
sequences that can encode the protein. In re Wallach, 378 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The 
court reached this conclusion even though the protein sequence does not precisely predict a 
particular DNA or RNA sequence because more than one codon codes for each amino acid in 
the protein. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 44, at 336. Thus, if the nucleic acid genus is predicable 
from the protein sequence, the binding sequence of an EST certainly is as well because it is 
perfectly predictable. 
 124. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1373–75 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 125. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 535. 
 126. Id. at 529, 535. 
 127. In re Joly, 376 F.2d 906, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 128. Id. 
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that they are used to study. ESTs differ from mRNA because they are 
chemically DNA, and are distinct from the genomic DNA because 
noncoding segments within genes and surrounding chromosomal 
sequences are removed.129 This difference is significant for 
patentability because the unpurified gene is unpatentable, but the 
purified EST is patentable subject matter.130 Because this distinction 
from the underlying gene qualifies the EST as patentable subject 
matter, it would be illogical to collapse the distinction by considering 
the EST itself as an object of use-testing simply because it enables 
research on the unpurified gene.131 
Second, the Fisher court’s characterization of ESTs as research 
intermediates without analyzing the products132 fails to disprove utility 
because, under Joly, utility may be shown by evaluating the products 
of the intermediates.133 To the extent that ESTs qualify as 
intermediates,134 their products have real world uses other than as 
objects of use-testing.135 Genome maps produced in part from ESTs 
 
 129. See supra note 47 and accompanying text; see also ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 44, at 
G:6 (cDNA is a “DNA molecule made as a copy of messenger RNA and therefore lacking the 
introns that are present in genomic DNA”).  
 130. See Tanya Wei, Comment, Patenting Genomic Technology – 2001 Utility Examination 
Guidelines: An Incomplete Remedy in Need of Prompt Reform, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307, 
321–322 (2003) (“Since the sequenced gene fragments, like ESTs, do not exist in their natural 
state and are therefore ‘not nature’s handiwork,’ they are ‘patentable subject matter under  
§ 101.’” (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980))). Under the Parke-Davis 
& Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), analysis of purification, a purified 
substance is considered a “new ‘composition of matter.’” Id. at 103. 
 131. Even if the chemical analysis were abandoned and ESTs were viewed as identical to the 
DNA or mRNA based on the same informational content, the EST is still not identical to the 
entire genome it is used to map. Thus, even if the EST were an object of use-testing, its use as 
an intermediate could be demonstrated under Joly by showing the map it created was useful. 
 132. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Just as the claimed compounds 
in Kirk and Joly were useful only as intermediates in the synthesis of other compounds of 
unknown use, the claimed ESTs can only be used as research intermediates in the identification 
of underlying protein-encoding genes of unknown function. The rationale of Kirk and Joly thus 
applies here.”). 
 133. In re Joly, 376 F.2d 906, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 134. The use of the ESTs in a microarray can be a direct use not dependent on 
intermediaries. ESTs are generally 400 to 500 bases in length. Holman & Munzer, supra note 1, 
at 749. One study compared microarray probes between 25 and 1000 bases long, and recognized 
there are microarrays with cDNA probes. Cheng-Chung Chou et al., Optimization of Probe 
Length and the Number of Probes per Gene for Optimal Microarray Analysis of Gene 
Expression, 32 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES., 1, 7 (2004). 
 135. See supra Part III.A. 
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are widely recognized as useful to scientists who study genes.136 The 
PCR primers created from ESTs are useful to detect or isolate a 
sequence,137 and scientists recognize the creation of constructs 
decreasing protein levels as a useful tool for studying protein 
function.138 Unlike the process in Brenner or the intermediate in Joly, 
the EST is not used to make the underlying gene being studied 
because that gene already exists.139 Thus, the ESTs should have 
substantial utility because researchers use their products to study the 
distinct underlying gene. 
The ESTs and their products are used as research tools,140 but 
status as a research tool does not alone determine the usefulness of an 
invention or automatically preclude patentability.141 Instead, 
patentability depends on the existence of substantial utility, or if 
further research is required to confirm the utility.142 The identified 
uses of ESTs as research tools require no further research to 
confirm.143 A good analogy for ESTs is nucleotide sequencers, which 
have a clear and accepted utility in analyzing compounds.144 Even 
though the nucleotide sequencer produces a chemical with the same 
sequence as a portion of the gene or genome under study,145 the 
nucleotide sequencer still has utility. The same should be true for the 
ESTs. 
 
 136. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 44, at 507–08 (noting that having a genomic map 
allows evolutionary relationships to be traced between genes and organisms, to discover new 
genes, and to predict the function of genes). 
 137. Id. at 508–09. 
 138. See, e.g., Shenliang Wang et al., Tools For Target Identification and Validation, 8 
CURRENT OPINION IN CHEMICAL BIOLOGY 371, 373–74 (2004) (describing the importance of 
inhibiting a gene’s function in identifying drug targets, and the ability to “knockdown” a gene 
with the introduction of RNA sequences matching those of the target gene).  
 139. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 520 n.1, 532 (1966) (describing the steroid-
producing process that that the Court found to lack utility); In re Joly, 376 F.2d 906, 908 
(C.C.P.A. 1967) (describing the argument that the claimed compounds were intermediates that 
created compounds with a known use). 
 140. See supra Part III.A. 
 141. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 143. The dissent in Fisher considered the use of ESTs as a research tool sufficient to show 
utility. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J. dissenting) (“While I 
agree that an invention must demonstrate utility to satisfy § 101, these claimed ESTs have such 
a utility, at least as research tools in isolating and studying other molecules.”). 
 144. MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I). 
 145. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 44, at 505 fig. 8–36 (illustrating the process of 
sequences that produces molecules with the nucleotides in the same order as the molecule being 
sequenced). 
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A less apt, but still relevant, analogous technology is the 
microscope. While a microscope reveals the physical structure of an 
unknown substance or object, the ESTs can help reveal the structure 
of the corn genome or a gene’s function.146 To understand the function 
of the structure seen through a microscope, further research is 
typically required.147 Thus, ESTs should not be disqualified merely 
because they do not immediately reveal the ultimate function of the 
underlying gene. 
The court in Fisher, however, draws a distinction between 
research tools used to study one or a few compositions and those 
tools used to study a potentially large number of compositions.148 For 
the Fisher court, the ESTs differ significantly from the microscope 
because they only detect material with the same sequence, which the 
court claims does not provide information about the function of the 
gene.149 This ignores that genetically-based research tools are useful 
precisely because they detect and can be used to manipulate only the 
genetic material similar to them, which is actually how researchers 
gather information on the function of the genes.150 There is no 
difference in the presence or absence of utility in cases of research 
tools that can be used to study a single material or multiple materials; 
there is only a difference in the scope of utility, which is not relevant 
to patentability since only one assertion of utility is required.151 
 
 146. See Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1380 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“Both [the microscope and ESTs] 
advance research and bring scientists closer to unlocking the secrets of the corn genome to 
provide better food production for the hungry world.”). 
 147. Id. For example, cancerous cells can be identified under a microscope, but further 
research is required to grasp why the cancer spreads and understand the compounds that 
interact with the cancer. Id. at 1380–81. The use of ESTs is clear because they “have already 
been used to advance cancer research well beyond what is achievable using microscopes alone.” 
Id. at 1381 n.1. 
 148. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1373 (“[A] microscope has the specific benefit of optically 
magnifying an object to immediately reveal its structure. One of the claimed ESTs, by contrast, 
can only be used to detect the presence of genetic material having the same structure as the EST 
itself.”). 
 149. Id. The MPEP also states there is no utility in “assaying for or identifying a material 
that has no specific and/or substantial utility.” MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I). 
 150. For example, analyzing gene expression can provide some indication of a gene’s 
function. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 44, at 536. Decreasing, increasing, or altering either the 
time or location of protein expression further aid in identifying the function of the gene. Id. 
Some of the uses of ESTs, such as in microarrays or PCR, do allow for the study of a gene’s 
function in these ways. See supra Part III.A. 
 151. Also, there is no indication that the Fisher court’s distinction tracks the division 
between inventions with an identified utility and those that require further research to confirm. 
See supra Part III.A. 
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The Fisher court’s treatment of objects of use testing and 
research tools is inconsistent with Brenner because the Fisher court 
inappropriately attempted to alter the definition of object of use-
testing provided by the Supreme Court. In Brenner, the Court defined 
an “object of use-testing” as something that was itself an “object of 
scientific research.”152 The Federal Circuit impermissibly redefined 
the Supreme Court’s standard for an “object of use-testing” as an 
“object[] upon which scientific research could be performed with no 
assurance that anything useful will be discovered in the end.”153 If 
patents were not allowed on inventions that lack an “assurance that 
anything useful will be discovered at the end,” patents would be 
unavailable for many important research tools because of the 
uncertainty inherent in most research.154 Thus, although it is not 
certain what ESTs and nucleotide sequencers will discover, neither is 
itself an object of study and both are used to study an underlying gene 
or genome.155 Thus, the ESTs in Fisher should not have failed for lack 
of substantial utility. 
C. The Proposed Uses Meet the Specific Utility Standard 
Just as the ESTs have substantial utility, they also have specific 
utility. Specific utility appears to have multiple meanings, one defined 
previously by the courts and the other adopted by the PTO and 
accepted in Fisher. The standard previously adopted by the courts 
 
 152. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966). For example, in Brenner, the steroid was 
an object of use-testing because its only use was as an object of research. See supra note 126 and 
accompanying text. 
 153. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1373. This is consistent with other cases where the Federal Circuit 
has disregarded the Supreme Court’s determinations. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002) (“The Court of Appeals ignored the guidance of 
Warner-Jenkinson [a Supreme Court decision], which instructed that courts must be cautious 
before adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing community.” 
(describing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997))); J. Jason 
Lang, Comment, The German Resolution: A Proposed Doctrine of Equivalents Analysis and a 
Flexible Rule of Prosecution History Estoppel for Biotechnology, 52 EMORY L.J. 427, 486 (2003) 
(“[T]he Federal Circuit dogmatically invokes the triple-identity test, ignoring Supreme Court’s 
counsel and the test’s obvious unsuitability for biotechnology.”). 
 154. See Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1380 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“These criticisms would foreclose 
much scientific research and many vital research tools. Often scientists embark on research with 
no assurance of success and knowing that even success will demand ‘significant additional 
research.’”). 
 155. See supra note 145 and accompanying text; see also MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I) 
(recognizing that nucleotide sequencers are patentable, despite being research tools, because 
they have clear, specific, and substantial utilities). 
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should be used because of the problems in applying the Fisher 
standard to other technological fields. 
Courts initially defined specific utility as requiring that “an 
application must disclose a use which is not so vague as to be 
meaningless.”156 The primary example of a use “so general as to be 
meaningless” was “biological properties.”157 It was a “nebulous” 
expression that did not convey a “more explicit indication of the 
usefulness of the compounds and how to use them . . . .”158 This 
standard requires distinguishing between situations where a use is 
disclosed and those where the application fails to specify “why [the 
invention] is considered useful”159 or only “vaguely intimate[s]” the 
use.160 
The application in Fisher meets this definition of specific utility 
because the proffered uses were sufficiently precise that one skilled in 
the art would know how the invention could be used.161 The 
application expressly identified the particular biological properties 
and their applications, which sufficiently demonstrates specific 
utility.162 
The PTO asserted a different standard, however, which the 
Fisher court adopted with no extended analysis,163 despite deviating 
significantly from previous case law.164 Under this standard, specific 
utility must be “specific to the subject matter claimed,” as opposed to 
 
 156. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371. 
 157. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 940 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 158. Id. 
 159. MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I). 
 160. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 161. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.A. 
 162. The uses are not too general because while all chemicals have some biological property, 
not all chemicals have the uses asserted in Fisher. For example, a use as a chromosome marker 
or gene probe appear to be clear assertions of utility. 
 163. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (accepting the PTO’s standard 
merely by saying it is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of utility). 
 164. The MPEP fails to cite any support for the PTO’s interpretation of specific utility. 
MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I). The only case cited in the relevant section, Knapp v. 
Anderson, 477 F.2d 588 (C.C.P.A 1973), supports the proposition that “[a] general statement of 
diagnostic utility, such as diagnosing an unspecified disease, would ordinarily be insufficient 
absent a disclosure of what condition can be diagnosed,” especially if a useful invention could 
arise from the claimed invention. MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I); see Knapp, 477 F.2d at 
590–91 (finding no reduction to practice because laboratory testing was insufficient to show the 
invention could be used in the asserted ways). This is consistent with the Federal Circuit 
ignoring policy issues and instead accepting the decisions of the PTO on significant patentability 
matters. See infra Part IV.A. 
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the general utility applicable to the broad class of inventions.165 This 
differs from the prior standard that did not suggest the use must be 
exclusive to the invention, only that it must be clear.166 The PTO 
particularly asserts that a use as a “gene probe” or a “chromosome 
marker” is not sufficient, but is instead analogous to claiming 
“biological properties.”167 
Because patent law is typically technology neutral,168 this 
standard would presumably apply generally, which would be 
problematic. For example, multiple patents protect steroids appearing 
to have a common general structural formula and that are all claimed 
to act as anti-inflammatories.169 If only specific properties not 
applicable to the class were considered for utility, perhaps these 
patents on steroids would be barred by the PTO’s standard as well. 
While this presents problems for technological fields, the PTO’s 
specific utility standard also appears inconsistent with the suggestion 
in Brenner that if the steroids could have been shown to have the 
same properties as the homologue, they would be patentable.170 
Thus, because the PTO’s standard is problematic when applied 
to other technologies and is inconsistent with previous case law, the 
original standard developed by courts should have been used to find 
the ESTs have specific utility. 
IV.  THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND PROBLEMS OF FISHER 
A. Policy, Institutional Roles and Competence, and Fisher 
The actions of the Fisher court support the assertions of 
Professor Rai that no institution in the patent system adequately 
 
 165. MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I). 
 166. See supra notes 156–60 and accompanying text. 
 167. MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I). 
 168. Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1156. 
 169. See, e.g., Steroid Compounds, U.S. Patent No. 5,116,829 (filed April 10, 1991) (issued 
May 26, 1992); Soft Steroids Having Anti-Inflammatory Activity, U.S. Patent No. 4,710,495 
(filed April 8, 1985) (issued Dec. 1, 1987). 
 170. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 522, 532 (1966) (noting that the steroids in the 
class with the claimed compound under investigation had potential tumor-inhibiting effects, and 
accepting the PTO’s determination that there was insufficient evidence of such effect from the 
claimed compound). 
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deals with policy issues.171 Congress has delegated the power to 
develop the patent statute through policy elaboration to the courts,172 
but the Federal Circuit in Fisher refused to consider public policy 
because it believed the task fell to Congress.173 This refusal to consider 
policy is consistent with the broader observation that the Federal 
Circuit’s opinions display a general disinterest in both economics and 
policy.174 
Because neither the Congress nor the Federal Circuit appear 
willing to consider policy, this leaves the PTO to make policy by 
issuing guidelines interpreting the patent statute,175 as was the case in 
Fisher.176 Because the Federal Circuit in Fisher followed these 
guidelines without extended analysis,177 even though the guidelines do 
not receive formal deference from courts,178 the PTO became the de 
facto policy maker. This is problematic, however, because the PTO 
may not be competent to make economic and policy decisions.179 
Thus, Fisher illustrates the patent system’s institutional difficulties in 
dealing with policy issues. 
B. The Absence of a Meaningful Distinction Between ESTs of Genes 
With and Without Known Functions, and the Problems with the 
Use of Utility in Trying to Create One 
The poor policy choices made in Fisher illustrate the inability of 
institutions in the patent system to adequately address policy issues. 
For example, the court’s distinction between ESTs for genes of 
known and unknown functions180 is not a principled distinction. This 
 
 171. See Rai, supra note 3, at 1040–41 (“[N]o institution has taken responsibility for 
elaborating patent law in the fact-specific, policy-oriented manner that the language of the 
statute encourages.”). 
 172. Id. at 1102. 
 173. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 174. Rai, supra note 3, at 1073 (“After all, the court’s opinions as a whole appear to betray 
little interest in economic or policy analysis.”). 
 175. Id. at 1131. 
 176. See, e.g., supra notes 60–68 and accompanying text. 
 177. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1372. 
 178. Rai, supra note 3, at 1132. The PTO does not have substantive rulemaking authority, 
which means its guidelines interpreting the patent statute do not receive judicial deference. Id. 
 179. Id. For example, the PTO does not employ economists and has an institutional culture 
that treats potential patentees as clients to be served rather than claimants needing to prove 
they deserve a patent. Id. at 1133. See infra Parts IV.B and IV.C for a discussion of the 
problems with the analysis ultimately adopted by the court consistent with the PTO’s policy. 
 180. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1375. 
08__JAMESON.DOC 11/14/2006  8:42 AM 
2006] IN RE FISHER 335 
attempted division also illustrates the problems with using utility to 
draw the desired policy distinctions. 
Fisher does not make a principled distinction because ESTs of 
genes with and without known functions are used in much the same 
way.181 The primary uses of the ESTs are as research tools,182 and they 
are used to study what is unknown about the underlying genes, 
regardless of whether or not the gene’s central function is known. 
Given this, there may be more utility in ESTs for genes without 
known functions and properties.183 ESTs of genes without known 
functions will provide researchers with even more information about 
the underlying gene because even the general function will be 
learnable. The dissent notes the majority may have made a value 
judgment that ESTs do not produce “enough valuable information.”184 
The majority’s approach is problematic because science proceeds in 
incremental steps and the majority lacks a sufficient “scientific 
foundation” to make its determination.185 
Similarly, no policy distinctions exist between ESTs of genes with 
known or unknown functions based on Brenner’s reasoning. The 
Brenner Court wanted to avoid granting a monopoly if the bounds of 
the monopoly were not precisely delineated.186 It is not clear, 
however, why the bounds of a patent would be significantly less 
defined if the genes underlying the ESTs lacked a known function, 
particularly because the bounds of a patent are not defined by 
 
 181. See, e.g., EGVIII Endoglucanase and Nucleic Acids Encoding the Same, U.S. Patent 
No. 7,049,125 (filed Dec. 18, 2001) (issued May 23, 2006) (describing the use of a gene to 
identify and study similar genes in other organisms); Salicylic Acid Biosynthetic Genes and Uses 
Thereof, U.S. Patent No. 7,070,772 (filed July 18, 2001) (issued July 4, 2006) (providing uses for 
the gene including creating PCR primers and controlling protein expression). 
 182. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 183. Corrected Brief for Appellants, supra note 72, at 39–40. 
 184. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1380 (Rader, J., dissenting). If this were the majority’s basis for the 
decision, the criticism would apply equally well to ESTs with and without known functions 
because the uses for ESTs with and without known functions are essentially the same. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“[W]e believe a more compelling 
consideration is that a process patent in the chemical field, which has not been developed and 
pointed to the degree of specific utility, creates a monopoly of knowledge which should be 
granted only if clearly commanded by the statute. Until the process claim has been reduced to 
production of a product shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that monopoly are not 
capable of precise delineation. Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this 
point . . . there is insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove 
to be a broad field.”). 
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utility.187 Moreover, Brenner only requires that courts avoid granting a 
monopoly over inventions with no utility,188 which is irrelevant to 
determining whether ESTs have utility in the first place. 
Also, ESTs are unlike a “hunting license”189 in the way likely 
intended by the Brenner Court. Because ESTs are tools to be used 
rather than mere discoveries, they are “commerce” rather than 
“philosophy.”190 There is no continuing search for a use for the ESTs 
because the uses are already known. “Search” cannot refer to a 
search using the patented product as a tool, as the Fisher court 
interprets it,191 because this would bar the patentability of all research 
tools, at least some of which have clearly been patentable.192 
Even though the Fisher court did not address the impact of EST 
patents on the anticommons, these concerns also fail to provide a 
basis upon which to distinguish between patents on ESTs of genes 
with known and those with unknown functions. A “tragedy of the 
anticommons” occurs when a resource is underused because multiple 
owners “have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource and no 
one has an effective privilege of use.”193 In the EST context, this leads 
to concerns that multiple overlapping patents on the same underlying 
gene or protein will issue, and all of them would need to be cleared 
 
 187. See Melissa E. Horn, Note, DNA Patenting and Access to Healthcare: Achieving the 
Balance Among Competing Interests, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 253, 279 (2003) (“[O]ne utility 
description is enough to get a patent that covers all of a gene’s functions . . . .”). It was also 
recognized in another opinion in Brenner that “advance knowledge of a specific product use 
[does not] provide much safeguard on this score or fix ‘metes and bounds’ precisely since a 
hundred more uses may be found after a patent is granted and greatly enhance its value.” 
Brenner, 383 U.S. at 537 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 188. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534–35 (majority opinion). 
 189. Id. at 536. 
 190. See id. at 536 (“‘[A] patent system must be related to the world of commerce rather 
than to the realm of philosophy . . . .’” (quoting In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 970 (C.C.P.A. 
1965))). Although there is some question as to the literal commercial success of the ESTs, this 
should be largely irrelevant to Brenner’s distinction. See Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1370, 1377 
(describing the patentee’s claim to the commercial success of the ESTs and the courts’ 
determination that commercial success was irrelevant since evidence was not presented). 
 191. Despite the application’s asserted uses for ESTs as research tools, see supra Part III.A 
& III.B, the Fisher court nonetheless found that “[t]he claimed ESTs themselves are not an end 
of Fisher's research effort, but only tools to be used along the way in the search for a practical 
utility.” Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1376.  
 192. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
 193. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998). 
08__JAMESON.DOC 11/14/2006  8:42 AM 
2006] IN RE FISHER 337 
prior to performing research.194 Even without multiple patents on a 
single gene, uses, such as microarrays, that require large numbers of 
genes to be effective would still encounter anticommons problems. 
Because there would be many patents on upstream research, the 
patents could completely “strangle downstream product development 
in a morass of required licenses”195 and block groups of researchers 
from the patented ESTs,196 or at least drive up research costs.197 
Rather than fulfilling the Constitutional goal of patents in promoting 
progress,198 such patents could “discourage research, delay scientific 
discovery, and thwart progress in the ‘useful Arts’ and ‘Science.’”199 
Because “progress” depends on using research tools, patents on ESTs 
could stifle future innovation by preventing the creation of another 
patentable invention.200  
If the Federal Circuit’s goal was to avoid some of these problems 
the distinction between ESTs with and without known functions does 
not significantly aid in that effort. Regardless of whether a function 
must be shown, different companies will still own patents on ESTs, 
which could create an anticommons. Even if a function requirement 
could ensure there would be only one patent per gene, researchers 
developing technologies requiring multiple genes would still have 
difficulties coordinating licenses. While a requirement to show a 
function could possibly delay patenting and allow for the creation of 
more prior art, this would not necessarily dissuade individuals from 
 
 194. Debora Robertson, EST Patent Granted for Human Kinase Homologs, 17 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 125, 125 (1999) (“Jack Tribble, head of Merck’s (Wilmington, DE) 
biotechnology patent group, points out another problem. ‘If there are multiple patents on ESTs 
within a well-known gene, one may require license for [all] those ESTs so you can use the full-
length gene,’ he says.”). 
 195. Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1195–96. 
 196. Debora Robertson, EST Patent Granted for Human Kinase Homologs, 17 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 125, 125 (1999). 
 197. Olsen, supra note 10, at 323. 
 198. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 199. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (presenting the government’s 
argument that ESTs without utility would discourage research and discovery) (quoting U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 200. See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?: Experimental Use and the 
Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 123 (2004) (“[W]hen research tools are patented . . . 
[progress] usually depends upon using an embodiment of the invention—the research tool 
itself—to make a further, and often patentable, innovation. . . . The concern with patented 
research tools arises from the fear that a research tool may give the tool inventor the ability to 
block technological progress by controlling the research that may be performed using the 
tool . . . .”). 
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seeking patents. To avoid anticipating disclosures, greater secrecy 
could be employed until a sufficient function was discovered.201 This 
could result in both a less cooperative scientific community202 and 
wasteful duplication of efforts.203 Thus, distinguishing between ESTs 
of genes with known and unknown functions does not avoid an 
anticommons, and it produces other problems. 
The central problem is that the utility doctrine is not well 
adapted to draw the relevant policy distinctions desired.204 It may be 
advantageous to exclude inexpensive and easy to develop research 
tools, such as ESTs, from patentability because patents would create 
high transactions costs and costs to creativity.205 On the other hand, it 
could be detrimental to exclude research tools that are expensive and 
time-consuming to create, such as certain types of genetically 
engineered mice,206 which require incentives to develop and the 
transaction and creativity costs are low. Thus, a desirable doctrine 
should be able to exclude ESTs, but allow some genetically 
engineered mice. The utility standard, however, is incapable of 
accomplishing this because it applies generally to all inventions 
without consideration of the difficulty in creating the invention, 
 
 201. See Joshua A. Newberg & Richard L. Dunn, Keeping Secrets in the Campus Lab: Law, 
Values and Rules of Engagement for Industry-University R&D Partnerships, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 
187, 227, 238–39 (2002) (explaining policies of a university laboratory collaborating with 
industry to delay disclosure, particularly through publication, until a patent application can be 
filed and an expectation by the university of contractual restrictions on disclosure). 
 202. The ideal conditions for facilitating science are “[p]erfect interconnectivity and open 
access,” which greater secrecy due to patents or the desire for credit can hinder. Jim Chen, 
Biodiversity and Biotechnology: A Misunderstood Relation, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 51, 66 
(2005). Patents under a low utility requirement system at least allow for safe disclosure by 
scientists after filing the patent application, even if researchers are still excluded from their use. 
See Newberg & Dunn, supra note 201, at 227, 238–39 (describing delay of disclosure, not failing 
to disclose, to the scientific community in the current system). 
 203. Patents allow firms “to signal each other, thus reducing the amount of duplicative 
investment in innovation.” Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 
J.L. & ECON. 265, 278 (1977). If secrecy increases, a competing firm would wastefully expend 
efforts researching the invention when it had already been discovered. Id. 
 204. Although Professor Rai notes that the utility analysis could be used as a proxy for a 
complicated economic analysis, Rai, supra note 59, at 141, the Fisher court claims to be 
uninterested in this type of policy analysis, Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1378. Regardless, it is difficult to 
understand why the Federal Circuit would contradict precedent without some policy motivation. 
Thus, the Federal Circuit may be performing a complicated economic analysis, unaided and 
unchecked, in the guise of adhering to precedent. 
 205. Rai, supra note 59, at 140–41. 
 206. Id. at 141. 
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transaction costs, or creativity costs.207 Therefore, other limits on 
patentability, such as nonobviousness, may better draw the distinction 
because they can address these issues and preclude, rather than 
merely delay, the patent.208 
C. Problems with and Explanations of the Technology-Specific Rules 
Without any overt consideration of technology-specific policy, 
the Fisher court appears to have applied sub silentio a different 
standard for utility that may apply only to this specific technology and 
that is not well suited to address the relevant policy considerations.209 
In this way, Fisher illustrates the problems in unguided technology-
specific rules and potential explanations for these problems. 
Theoretically, the patent system “provides technology-neutral 
protection to all kinds of technologies” with flexible standards 
designed to apply to a wide assortment of technologies.210 Professors 
Burk and Lemley note, however, that technology-specific standards 
do exist through different applications of the same rule.211 In 
biotechnology generally, they found a low nonobviousness standard, 
but a stricter enablement and written description requirement than in 
other disciplines.212 They explain that the “person having ordinary 
skill in the art” (PHOSITA) in biotechnology is assumed by the 
courts to know little about his or her field.213 
Thus, the Fisher case is not novel in applying divergent 
technology-specific rules, and at least the court’s altered evidentiary 
standard214 can be explained under the PHOSITA theory. If the 
Federal Circuit assumed that biotechnology practitioners know little 
about their field,215 the Federal Circuit would require more proof than 
would actually be necessary to convince today’s biotechnology 
 
 207. Id. 
 208. See infra note 231. 
 209. See supra Part IV.B. 
 210. Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1156. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. See id. at 1157, 1192–93 (“The court seems to believe that biotechnology is as much a 
black art as a science, where the result of experimentation is largely out of the skilled artisan’s 
hands.”). The more skill those in the art have, the less information an applicant has to disclose 
in order to meet the enablement requirement, but the harder it is to meet the nonobviousness 
requirement. Id. at 1156.  
 214. See supra Part III.A. 
 215. Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1156.  
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practitioner of the uses of ESTs. Although the PHOSITA standard 
may provide the necessary flexibility for patent law to apply to 
different technologies,216 the level of skill in biotechnology appears to 
have been set at an earlier time and has not changed with the field.217 
This is a problem because the decisions do not accurately reflect the 
realities of the industry, making the rules adopted inappropriate for 
the industry in which they are specifically applied.218 
Nevertheless, the PHOSITA standard does not explain the larger 
change in specific and substantial utility for biotechnology because 
PHOSITAs are not a part of the remainder of the utility analysis.219 
There are two probable, coexisting explanations for the 
biotechnology-specific utility standard. First, the Federal Circuit may 
not understand the technology. This is a likely explanation because 
the technical knowledge of the Federal Circuit is limited to the 
training of the individuals within it, who could not possibly be 
technically trained in all the necessary areas in which cases arise.220 
The court’s failure to engage in a technical analysis of utility 
illustrates this point.221 This possibility is troublesome because it 
suggests that the Federal Circuit bases its judgments on its own 
beliefs about the field rather than an analysis of the actual case, and 
thus making an incorrect result likely. 
Second, despite claiming a lack of interest in policy,222 the Federal 
Circuit could be attempting to create a separate standard for 
biotechnology to meet its special needs by deliberately manipulating 
the doctrine.223 If the court is motivated by policy yet does not 
articulate its policy rationales, it precludes the development of 
 
 216. Id. at 1157. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See id. (“[W]e believe the courts must take more care than they currently do to ensure 
that their assessments of patent validity are rooted in understandings of the technology that 
were accurate at the time the invention was made.”). 
 219. Moreover, the utility standard has no explicit technology-specific aspect like the 
PHOSITA. Thus, the utility standard is particularly ill-suited to become a technology-specific 
standard because it is expected to apply generally. See supra notes 204–07 and accompanying 
text. The Fisher court’s utility standard is described as technology-specific because the court 
may never apply the standard outside DNA sequence patents or biotechnology, particularly 
because the application of this standard in other areas would result in problems. See supra notes 
168–70 and accompanying text. 
 220. Rai, supra note 3, at 1068–69. 
 221. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 222. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (majority opinion). 
 223. Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1194–95. 
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coherent patent policy in the case law224 and stymies the evaluation of 
patent policy by other institutions.225 This is of particular concern 
when the courts can be mistaken about the policy needs of the 
industry, as Professors Burk and Lemley have observed in the 
biotechnology context.226 It would be further disconcerting to have a 
court disavow interest in policy matters,227 and then make policy-
based decisions.  
To make appropriate technology-specific standards suited to the 
needs of the field, there must be an accurate analysis both of the field 
and of the relevant policy, neither of which was present in Fisher. To 
explain the absence of technical analysis228 and the departure from 
precedent for no explicit reason,229 it appears most likely the court 
attempted to draw a technology-specific standard without articulating 
the policy basis and misunderstood the technology. 
CONCLUSION 
The use of the utility standard is unnecessary because there are 
several alternatives to limit the patentability of ESTs. For example, 
Congress could decide to alter patent laws or create a separate system 
of rights from patent to address the special needs of biotechnology.230 
Alternatively, the courts could alter the nonobviousness standard to 
better reflect the current needs of biotechnology.231 
Nevertheless, the Fisher court chose to use the utility standard to 
try to exclude certain EST patents. The application of the utility 
 
 224. Rai, supra note 3, at 1073. 
 225. Cf. id. at 1125 (suggesting that review by other courts would cause the Federal Circuit 
to address persuasive policy arguments in its opinions). 
 226. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1195 (noting the Federal Circuit’s approach to 
biotechnology was likely to cause an anticommons). 
 227. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 228. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 229. See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text. 
 230. Olsen, supra note 10, at 331–33. 
 231. The nonobviousness requirement appears better suited to exclude ESTs, but not other 
valuable inventions, because it considers whether “a patentable invention represent[s] an 
advance over the prior art that would not have been obvious to someone of ‘ordinary skill in the 
art.’” Rai, supra note 59, at 107; In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J., 
dissenting). However, In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1158–59 (Fed. Cir. 1995), which found a protein 
sequence and a method of cloning a gene were not sufficient to make the sequence obvious, 
would need to be overturned. See Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1382 (Rader, J., dissenting) 
(“Unfortunately this court has deprived the Patent Office of the obviousness requirement for 
genomic inventions.”). 
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standard to draw a distinction between ESTs of genes with known 
and unknown functions had no basis in policy. Further, the analysis of 
the utility standard was flawed in its use of the evidentiary standard, 
substantial utility, and specific utility. Finally, the flawed analysis in 
the Fisher case supports the theory that the patent system has no 
adequate institution to deal with policy, and provides insight into the 
nature of technology-specific rules. Thus, regardless of whether the 
court reached the right result in denying the patent in this particular 
case, the reasoning behind this decision was problematic and may 
prove detrimental. 
